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A b s t r a c t
In the present paper, the case of a database of scientific articles is described. There can be observed the quantitative 
effects of the increasing strength of cooperation between scholars. It is manifested in time-related features changes 
of the numbers distribution of a single co-authors’ article. The distribution of the number of co-authors of an article 
recorded in the database evolves with time from a profile with no more than one author to a profile with several 
authors. A social dilemma model is proposed to explain the dynamics of changes in the distribution of the number 
of co-authors. The most successful strategy of the three considered alternative strategies of cooperation is selected.
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S t r e s z c z e n i e
W niniejszym artykule, na podstawie bazy artykułów naukowych, opisano ilościowy efekt wzrostu współpracy 
uczonych, która objawia się zmianami cech rozkładu liczby współautorów artykułu w czasie. Rozkład liczby 
współautorów artykułu dostępnego w bazie danych zmienia się w czasie z maksimum dla jednego autora do 
maksimum kilku autorów. Do wyjaśnienia dynamiki zmian rozkładu liczby współautorów zaproponowano model 
dylematu społecznego. Spośród trzech została wybrana jedna strategia współpracy odnosząca największe sukcesy.
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1. Introduction
Cooperation is fundamental to numerous biological and social systems. Multicellular 
organisms, social insects, herds of animals and human societies are examples of systems 
that are dependent on cooperative interactions. Explaining the emergence of cooperation has 
been a challenge since Darwin. Apparently, cooperators help others at a cost to themselves, 
while defectors receive the benefits of altruism without providing any help in return. The 
emergence of cooperation has been studied based on tools developed within the framework 
or evolutionary game theory. Games such as prisoner’s dilemma games (PDGs) [1], 
snowdrift games (SGs) [2] and stag-hunt games (SHs) [3] form the standard set of social 
dilemmas. All aforementioned evolutionary games are played by a pair of players in which 
they receive a reward R for mutual cooperation and a punishment P for mutual defection. 
If one cooperates but the other defects, the defector (D) receives the payoff T, while the 
cooperator (C) gets the payoff S. In the case of PDG we have T R P S> > > .  In a SG, 
the payoff rank is T R S P> > > .  The stag-hunt game offers more support for cooperation 
because the rank of payoffs ( )R T P S> > >  favours cooperation over defection. Public 
goods games (PGGs) [4] engage many players and the number of players is an adjustable 
parameter. Cooperating players contribute to a common pool, which is then enhanced by 
a factor h and equally distributed between cooperators and defectors. According to these 
models, a cooperator pays a price to receive a benefit; conversely, a defector pays no price 
but can receive extra benefits. It is commonly assumed that cost and benefit are measured in 
terms of fitness. It transpires that in any mixed population, defectors have a higher average 
fitness than cooperators and thus, after some time, cooperators vanish from the population. 
However, it is possible that under some circumstances, cooperators are not extinct in the 
course of system evolution.
In the present study, the case of a real system of cooperating agents, which adjust their 
cooperation preferences to the varying competitive pressure is described. As a result, 
the number of agents engaged in a single cooperation event changes over the course 
of the evolution of the system. The analysis of the system is based on real-world data – 
a database compiling bibliographic details of articles published in scientific periodicals over 
the last 60 years. Publishing an article is a cooperative act and the cooperation preferences 
of the scholars can be quantitatively characterised by the features of the distribution of the 
number of co-authors of a single article. From the analysis of the database, it follows that 
the average number of co-authors increases with time. The modal value of the number of 
co-authors of a single article increased from 1 to 4 in the period from 1950 to 2010 – this 
is a clear sign of the increasing strength of cooperation. We propose a novel social dilemma 
model to explain the observed dynamics of the distribution of the number of co-authors; 
possible further developments of the model are also discussed.
2. Related works
Mechanisms that facilitate cooperation, include kin selection [5‒9], direct and indirect 
reciprocity [1, 10‒13], network reciprocity [14‒17], trust [18, 19], group selection [20, 21], 
cooperation in game theory [22, 23], and evolution of cooperation [24, 25].
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An important quantitative aspect of cooperation is the number of players engaged 
in a single play. The number of players playing the aforementioned social dilemma games 
is always fixed, while in the case of real systems, the number of players engaged in a single 
cooperation event is a quantity that should be set by the dynamics of the game. For example, 
in studies of the behaviour of predators [26‒29], the group size is partially determined by food 
intake, which is maximized for an optimal group size [30]. The problem of an optimal group 
size has been considered recently in the context of another social dilemma ‒ the volunteer’s 
dilemma [31], but in that case, the group size is not set dynamically in the course of the 
system evolution. A mechanism of setting group size, based on ecology-inspired principles, 
has also been proposed within the context of the public goods game [32, 33]. An emerging 
field of co-evolutionary games [34, 22] can become a convenient framework for studying 
the problem of how the output of the games played by the players may affect the interaction 
network.
The evolution of the research of cooperation could be extended into crawling systems [35], 
where such cooperation would improve crawling performance. The cooperation processes 
are able to be modelled using Petri nets [36] to visualise various cooperation mechanisms. 
Computational intelligence methods [37] appear to be usable for evolution games, they are 
both based on nature laws and should be combined into one research strategy.
3. Empirical data
The process of development of cooperation was analysed using data collected in the 
PubMed database (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed). PubMed is a free resource, 
maintained by the National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI), at the U.S. 
National Library of Medicine (NLM). At present, PubMed comprises over 20 million 
citations for biomedical literature from MEDLINE, life science journals, and online books. 
PubMed citations and abstracts include the fields of medicine, nursing, dentistry, veterinary 
medicine, the health care system, and preclinical sciences.
The advanced search functionality of PubMed enables searching for articles that match 
user-defined patterns based on a set of predefined fields provided by the search engine. The 
results of a query can be returned in the form of XML files – these can be easily analysed due 
to their well-defined syntax. In the present study, we queried PubMed for articles published 
in a single, randomly picked month of the year (April), for years in the range 1950 to 2010, 
with 5-year intervals. Only records with a complete list of authors and valid authorship data 
were analysed. Additionally, for every valid record, the scholars who written the article were 
counted and the distribution of the number of authors of published articles was determined 
for every analysed year. The distributions of the number of co-authors are shown in Fig. 1. 
The probability of finding an article published in April 1950, written by more than three 
authors is equal to around 10%, the modal number of co-authors of a single article is equal to 
4 for articles published in April 2010. Articles co-written by less than three authors constitute 
only about 23% of the total number of articles published in April 2010.
Note that the outcome of standard evolutionary games is the change of the fitness 
of the players adopting different strategies. By contrast, for the system described above, 
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the available quantitative data is the distribution of the number of co-authors and one can 
only speculate as to how the fitness of the scholars is related to that distribution.
Because it appears that the standard evolutionary models of cooperation (PDGs, SGs, 
SHs or PGGs) do not have enough features to determine the outcome of cooperation 
in the form, for example, joint publications, there is a need of the new tool to model the kind 
of data described above. It is important that possible models account for the competition 
between scholars for limited resources as the total volume of accessible journals is limited. 
Additionally, to build their prestige, scholars attempt to prepare publications that are of as 
high a standard as possible, but an author cannot generally compare the quality of his or her 
publications to the quality of publications by other authors – this is the task of the reviewers 
who score the submitted publications.
3.1. Model
To qualitatively explain the empirical data discussed in the previous section, we consider 
a population consisting of N agents. Each agent A is located on one site of a network G 
and can cooperate with other agents, provided that they are connected to agent A by an edge 
in G. Throughout this paper, it is assumed that G is a random graph, although other types 
of complex network underlying the model are clearly possible.
An agent is an abstract object characterised by the properties and actions which they 
can perform. The properties of an agent define their state, which is modified in the course 
of simulation. According to the proposed model, an agent’s properties are:
1. credit C
2. activity E
Fig. 1. Empirical distributions of the number of co-authors of a single article
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3. quality Q
4. standard deviation of quality sdQ
5. probability of cooperation P
6. list of neighbours L in the underlying network G
An agent can perform two actions. First, they can update their probability of 
cooperation P. The formula for probability of cooperation update can possibly depend upon 
an agent’s properties (e.g. their actual credit) and defines an agent’s strategy of cooperation. 
Secondly, an agent can compete for resources, submitting proposals for resource allocation. 
A proposal can be submitted individually or in cooperation with other agents, depending on 
probability of cooperation P.
The state of the system (defined as the state of all agents) is modified iteratively. At 
the beginning of the simulations, credit CA, activity EA, quality QA and standard deviation 
of quality sdQA of an agent A are drawn from normal distributions with the mean and 
standard deviation being the parameters of the model. Activity EA, quality QA and the 
standard deviation of quality sdQA are kept fixed during the simulations. The probability 
of cooperation PA of agent A is initially equal to 0 and is updated in every simulation step 
in accordance with the cooperation strategy of agent A. The list of neighbours LA is also fixed 
‒ it is assumed that the topology of G does not change in the course of simulation.
At every simulation step, the credit of each agent is decreased by a constant amount 
dC (which, for example, represents the costs of participating in the game). Then, with 
probability EA, every agent generates a proposal for resource allocation. A proposal for 
resource allocation R is an abstract object characterised by its quality QR and the list 
of agents LR, which have authorised it. When an agent A generates a proposal R, the quality 
of proposal QR is drawn from a normal distribution with mean and standard deviation equal 
to QA and sdQA respectively. The list of agents, which have authorised see above note R 
contains initially only one element – the agent A. Then for every agent B in LA, the agent A 
invites the agent B to participate in the proposal R. The invitation is accepted with probability 
PA · PB. After accepting an invitation, the quality QR of R is increased by amount q which 
is drawn from a normal distribution with mean and standard deviation equal to QB and sdQB 
respectively. Agent B is then added to LR.
All agents submit their proposals synchronously and a pool of all submitted proposals 
is created. The proposals are then scored by their quality and the authors of each proposal 
receive the payoffs based on the scores of their proposals. Each payoff is shared in equal parts 
between all authors of a proposal and the credit of each author is increased accordingly. It 
is assumed in the model that the total sum of payoffs is adjusted so as to keep the total sum 
of credits constant. In the simulations, it was also assumed that the payoff depends linearly 
on the rank of a proposal in the pool ‒ the proposal with the lowest quality receives zero 
payoff, while the proposal with the highest quality receives the highest payoff.
Three strategies of cooperation were studied. Agents adopting the strategy ‘Never 
cooperate’ keep their probability of cooperation always equal to zero. Agents adopting the 
strategy ‘Cooperate when in trouble’ increase their probability of cooperation whenever 
their credit decreases, otherwise they decrease their probability of cooperation. Agents 
adopting the strategy ‘Cooperate’ update their probability of cooperation whenever their 
credit decreases but never decrease it below the actual value. Every agent updates their 
90
probability of cooperation in every simulation step. It was assumed that the credit-probability 
of cooperation dependence is given by a sigmoid-like function approximating between 1 for 
low credits and 0 for large credits.
4. Social dilemma in the network of co-authors
To see that the model described above belongs to a class of social dilemmas, consider 
the following simplified version of the model. Let each agent be characterised by the same 
constant probability of cooperation P and a constant number of cooperators N. Assume for 
now that P determines the probability that a given agent acquires another agent to authorise 
his proposal. Let every agent accept the invitation to authorise other agent’s proposal with 
probability equal to 1. It should also be assumed that all agents submit their proposals at 
every time step and the payoff of the proposal authorised by k ³1  co-authors is equal to 
f k( ).  In the following equation, it is assumed that f k k( ) ,= α  where α³ 0  is an exponent. 
Then the average payoff S of a single agent can be split into two parts: the payoff SA from 
the proposal submitted by the agents and the payoff SC from the proposals of the agents, 
which have invited the agent to write their proposals. One has:
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After basic manipulation, it can be shown that:
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It follows immediately from Eq. 1 and 2 that if f k k( ) ,= α  then for any α³ 0  smaller 
than 1, the payoff SA of an agent which cooperates ( )P > 0  is smaller than 1, which is the 
payoff SA of a defector (P = 0). Consequently, a defector facing cooperators would have 
higher fitness than his cooperating co-players; thus, a rational player will choose the strategy 
to defect. On the other hand, it follows from Eq. 3 that the average payoff (equal to 1) 
in a network of defectors is lower than the average payoff in a network of cooperators. Thus, 
in the described system, the agents are facing a social dilemma. Note that the cooperation 
strategy is always advantageous if α> 0.
To solve the social dilemma described above, an additional constraints must be 
introduced to promote cooperation. In the present study, the reciprocity mechanism is 
adopted. In the case described above, cooperation cannot emerge because the probability 
P of acquiring a co-author is independent on the probability (equal to 1) of accepting other 
agents’ invitations to authorise their proposals. If each agent is instead characterised by 
91
a single probability of cooperation which determines both the probability of proposing 
authorship to other agents and the probability of accepting other agents invitations, then 
cooperation emerges, as is described in the next section.
4.1. Results
The results presented in the current section were obtained for the following values 
of model parameters. A random network of 1000 agents was created with the average number 
of neighbours being equal to 20 (the total number of network links was 10 times larger than 
the number of agents). The initial credit of the agents was drawn from normal distribution 
N (30, 2) with the mean and standard deviation equal to 30 and 2 respectively. At every 
simulation step, the credit was decreased by 0.1. The quality of agents was drawn from 
normal distribution N (2, 0.5). The standard deviation of quality was set to 0.2 and the activity 
was set to 0.5 for all agents. The credit-probability of cooperation dependence was given 
by the function:
 P C
eC
( ) /= +
1
1 10
 (4)
where P stands for the probability of cooperation and C stands for an agent’s credit.
The credit of agents adopting the strategy ‘Never cooperate’ is plotted against their quality 
in Fig. 2 for three points in time. Note that the destiny of an agent is completely determined 
by their quality; thus, in a sense, an agent has no way to escape their destiny. Inequality 
of credit share or social inequality increases over time. The distribution of credit values 
is more or less uniform after an initial transient period (Fig. 3).
Fig. 2. Credit plotted against the quality of agents in a network of agents adopting the strategy 
‘Never cooperate’. The results for time (measured in simulation steps) equal to 1 unit 
(triangles), 5,000 units (circles) and 10,000 units (squares)
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The credit of agents adopting the strategy ‘Cooperate when in troubles’ is plotted against 
their quality in Fig. 4 for four points in time. Also in this case a strong dependence between 
an agent’s quality and their credit is observed in some range of quality values, but that 
range shrinks with time. Comparison of Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, in which probability of cooperation 
is plotted vs. an agent’s quality indicates that that strong dependence is observed for agents 
which actually do not cooperate, keeping their probability of cooperation equal to zero. 
The group of non-cooperating agents disappears with time and a more or less egalitarian 
Fig. 3. The distribution of credits in a network of agents adopting the strategy ‘Never 
cooperate’. The results for time (measured in simulation steps) equal to 1 unit 
(top panel), 5,000 units (middle panel) and 10,000 units (bottom panel)
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Fig. 4. Credit plotted against the quality of agents in a network of agents adopting the strategy 
‘Cooperate when in trouble’. The results for time (measured in simulation steps) equal 
to 1 unit (top-left panel), 5,000 units (top-right panel), 10,000 units (bottom-left panel) 
and 30,000 units (bottom-right panel)
Fig. 5. Probability of cooperation plotted against the quality of agents in a network of agents 
adopting the strategy ‘Cooperate when in troubles’. The results for time (measured in 
simulation steps) equal to 1 (top-left panel), 5,000 units (top-right panel), 10,000 units 
(bottom-left panel) and 30,000 units (bottom-right panel)
94
society arises (Fig. 6). Although cooperation becomes yet more important in a network 
of agents adopting the strategy ‘Cooperate when in troubles’, the distribution of the number 
of co-authors of a single proposal converges to a profile which has a maximum for one 
author (Fig. 7). The average number of co-authors of a single proposal converges to 
1.78 ± 0.04 (Fig. 8).
Fig. 6. The distribution of credits in a network of agents adopting the strategy ‘Cooperate 
when in trouble’. The results for time (measured in simulation steps) equal to 1 unit 
(top-left panel), 5,000 units (top-right panel), 10,000 units (bottom-left panel) and 
30,000 units (bottom-right panel)
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Fig. 7. Model distributions of the number of co-authors of a single article for the case of agents 
adopting the strategy ‘Cooperate when in troubles’
Fig. 8. Average number of the co-authors of a single article plotted against the 
simulation step ‘time’ for the case of agents adopting the strategy ‘Cooperate 
when in trouble’. The error bars represent the mean square error of the average 
number of authors
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Fig. 9. Credit plotted against the quality of agents in a network of agents adopting the 
strategy ‘Cooperate’. The results for time (measured in simulation steps) equal to 
1 unit (top-left panel), 5,000 units (top-right panel), 10,000 units (bottom-left panel) 
and 80,000 units (bottom-right panel)
Fig. 10. Probability of cooperation plotted against the quality of agents in a network 
of agents adopting the strategy ‘Cooperate’. The results for time (measured in 
simulation steps) equal to 1 unit (top-left panel), 5,000 units (top-right panel), 
10,000 units (bottom-left panel) and 80,000 units (bottom-right panel)
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The credit of agents adopting the strategy ‘Cooperate’ is plotted against their quality 
in Fig. 9 for four points in time. Relatively early, two branches develop on the quality- 
-credit plot. The branch observed for high values of quality is the trace of the existence 
of the high-quality agents which have not yet decided to actively cooperate, thus  keeping 
their probability of cooperation low (Fig. 10). On the other hand, can be observed a branch 
Fig. 11. The distribution of credits in a network of agents adopting strategy 
‘Cooperate’. The results for time (measured in simulation steps) equal to 
1 unit (top-left panel), 5,000 units (top-right panel), 10,000 units (bottom-left 
panel) and 80,000 units (bottom-right panel)
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Fig. 12. Model distributions of the number of co-authors of a single article for a case 
of agents adopting the strategy ‘Cooperate’
Fig. 13. Average number of the co-authors of a single article plotted against simulation 
step ‘time’ for a case of agents adopting the strategy ‘Cooperate’. The error 
bars represent the mean square error of the average number of authors
99
in the range of low qualities is the trace of the action of low quality agents, that cooperate 
and join their attempts to gain a higher share in the resource allocation. After a long time the 
credit of agents is decoupled from their quality and the cooperation is the main mechanism, 
which determines an agent’s credit. The distribution of the agents’ credits is broader than in 
the case of agents adopting the strategy ‘Cooperate when in trouble’ and has an exponential 
tail (Fig. 11). Because of high competitive pressure (agents never decrease their probability 
of cooperation) in a network of agents adopting the strategy ‘Cooperate’, the modal value 
of the distribution of the number of co-authors of a single proposal moves to the right in time 
(Fig. 12). Obviously, there exists a natural limit for the evolution of this distribution, namely, 
the distribution of the neighbours in the underlying network of contacts G.  The average 
number of co-authors of a single proposal increases with time (Fig. 13).
Finally, we studied competition between agents adopting different strategies within the 
same network of contacts. Even for the fairly small fraction of agents adopting the strategy 
‘Cooperate’, these agents gain a much higher share of the total credit compared to agents 
adopting the strategy ‘Never cooperate’ (Fig. 14). Similar results (not shown) were obtained 
for networks consisting of agents adopting the strategies ‘Cooperate’ and ‘Cooperate when 
in trouble’.
Fig. 14. Average credit of agents adopting the strategy ‘Never cooperate’ (squares) 
and ‘Cooperate’ (circles) in a network consisting of agents of both types 
plotted against the fraction of agents adopting the strategy ‘Cooperate’. 
The error bars represent the mean square error of the average credit values
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5. Discussion
In the present paper, we have described the case of a database of scientific articles 
in which the emergence of cooperation between the scholars and the increasing 
strength of cooperation between them is manifested by an increasing average number of 
co-authors of a single article, recorded in the database. We have also proposed a social 
dilemma model to explain the dynamics of the changes in the distribution of the number 
of co-authors. Among three considered play strategies, the most successful strategy was 
selected.
Within the framework of the proposed model, the agents compete for common, limited 
resources, which are allocated to them based on their quality (or fitness). Based on the 
acquired fitness, the agents adjust their behaviour. Commonly, a generation exchange is 
implemented within the framework of evolutionary games – this feature is not embedded 
in the presented model because the time scale of the dynamics of the average number of 
co-authors observed in the PubMed database is of the same order as the typical duration 
of an academic career.
The proposed model demonstrates the mechanisms which can induce changes in the 
distribution of the number of co-authors. It is worth noticing that the dynamics exhibited 
by the system of agents competing for resources and developing cooperation in the course 
of simulation is an example of Red Queen dynamics [38]. The agents with low quality must 
cooperate in order to be allocated the resources they request, otherwise, the resources would 
be allocated to high quality agents. After a time, groups of cooperating low-quality agents 
become more effective in gaining resources; thus, high-quality agents are forced to cooperate 
under increasing competition pressure. However, this has an effect on the low-quality agents, 
which must strengthen their cooperation.
Many further developments are possible. First, in the present model there is only 
one probability of cooperation, which determines both the probability of inviting others 
to cooperate and the probability of accepting cooperation. In reality, the probability of 
invitation can be different from the probability of accepting invitations. Next, the probability 
of cooperation can be associated not with an agent but with an arc of the graph of contacts 
– there is no need to assume an undirected graph in this case because an agent can prefer 
cooperation with one of his neighbours over cooperation with another individual. In that 
case, the probability of cooperation can depend on the history of joint publication (successful 
publication increases probability of cooperation, while a fault decreases it) and on the quality 
of both sides the link. Next, the network structure was static in the present model, but in reality, 
it can change at the time scale during the simulations – the number of agents, the number 
of links and the topology of the graph can evolve over time. Additionally, the resources and 
the strategy for allocating the resources are fixed and this assumption can be easily relaxed. 
Finally, the proposed model can be reformulated within the evolutionary framework with 
credit interpreted as fitness. Another dynamic variable is the function which specifies how the 
payoff depends on the number of players. In the present paper, a simple form of a function 
was assumed but there are other choices possible, leading to the formation of stable groups. 
This problem is currently under study.
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The dilemma one is facing when investigating models like PDG is how cooperation 
arises in the population of selfish individuals. In the model described here, the individuals 
cooperate because they are selfish – to gain the best resources for themselves, they must 
create alliances.
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